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The epidemics of bovine spongiform encephalopathy and
variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease: current status and
future prospects
Peter G. Smith1
Abstract The large epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the United Kingdom has been in decline since 1992, but
has spread to other countries. The extensive control measures that have been put in place across the European Union and also in
Switzerland should have brought the transmission of BSE under control in these countries, provided that the measures were properly
enforced. Postmortem tests on brain tissue enable infected animals to be detected during the late stages of the incubation period, but
tests that can be performed on live animals (including humans) and that will detect infections early are urgently needed.
The number of infected animals currently entering the food chain is probably small, and the controls placed on bovine tissues in
the European Union and Switzerland should ensure that any risks to human health are small and diminishing. Vigilance is required in all
countries, especially in those in which there has been within-species recycling of ruminant feed. Fewer than 150 people, globally, have
been diagnosed with variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD), but there are many uncertainties about the future course of the epidemic
because of the long and variable incubation period. Better control measures are necessary to guard against the possibility of iatrogenic
transmission through blood transfusion or contaminated surgical instruments. These measures will require sensitive and specific
diagnostic tests and improved decontamination methods.
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Introduction
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD) has so far been
diagnosed in fewer than 150 people. The epidemic has
attracted considerable attention, which, in terms of global
threats to public health, some might consider to be
disproportionate to its size. There are several reasons for such
attention. First, vCJD appears to be a new disease. Second,
although the present number of cases is small, the average
incubation period is not known — it may be more than 10
years, and therefore many more people may be diagnosed in
the coming years. Third, the disease is widely thought to be
caused by a relatively newly recognized class of infectious
agent, the prion, which has several notable characteristics —
not least its ability to survive sterilizing processes that inactivate
most biological agents. Fourth, the disease has predominantly
affected young people, and its clinical course is relentless. The
disease is currently untreatable, very distressing, and uniformly
fatal. Fifth, a high proportion of the United Kingdom
population, as well as visitors to the country and people who
have consumed bovine products exported from the United
Kingdom, may have been exposed to the agent. Sixth, the
epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has had
a substantial impact on world trade and has raised concern
about the safety of a widely consumed food product, beef.
Seventh, in the United Kingdom alone, the cost of the BSE
epidemic has exceeded US$ 6 billion, and substantial additional
costs will continue to be incurred in the future, not least in
guarding against the possibility of iatrogenic transmission of
vCJD.
This review summarizes the evolution of the bovine and
human epidemics, speculates on their future development, and
summarizes some of the outstanding issues.
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Origins of the BSE epidemic
Although the first case of BSE was identified in the United
Kingdom in 1986, it is likely that some cases occurred earlier
than this but were not detected and that the origin of the
epidemic probably dates back to the 1970s. What caused the
first case of BSE, why the epidemic started in the United
Kingdom, and why it started when it did are questions that are
unresolved andmay remain so.What is clearer, however, is that
the epidemic was caused by the practice of feeding cattle the
waste parts of other cattle, which were not used for human
consumption, in the form of meat and bone meal (MBM) after
the bovine material had been rendered (1, 2). Rendering is the
process whereby the waste parts of cattle are heated to separate
out the fat and protein, so that the latter can be incorporated
into MBM, a high-protein supplement feed. Studies showed
that the rendering processes that were in use in the 1970s and
1980s in the United Kingdom, and in many other countries,
may not have completely inactivated the infective agent (3).
Once the BSE agent had been introduced into this
recycling process that transferred it from bovine to bovine,
cases increased in number to cause the epidemic of the disease
in the United Kingdom. In many respects, there are similarities
with the epidemic of kuru (a human form of transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE)) that affected several
thousand people in a remote tribe in Papua New Guinea (see
below).
Although it is reasonably certain that MBM caused the
epidemic in the United Kingdom once the infective agent had
entered cattle, how the infective agent got into cattle in the first
place is far less clear. There are many competing hypotheses
but two of the most plausible are that the initial case arose:
sporadically in a bovine, and that tissue from this animal
entered the rendering process (consequently, the infective
agent was transferred to other cattle through feed); or through
a cattle-adapted strain of the sheepTSE, scrapie, which entered
the rendering process in the waste parts of a sheep (as sheep
waste was also rendered and incorporated into MBM).
It is possible that BSE occurs sporadically in cattle at a
very low frequency. This has never been documented,
however, but if it is rare it might have been missed. Cases of
the most common form of the human transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathy, CJD, appear to occur sporadically in old
people at a very low incidence (1–2 per million per year). These
casesmay arise as a result of an endogenous process rather than
by some environmental trigger. A plausible explanation for the
origin of the epidemic of kuru in Papua New Guinea is that a
sporadic case of CJD arose in the tribe around 1900 and the
infective agent was passed to others through the cannibalistic
funeral rituals practised by the tribe when that person died (4–
6). The hypothesis of a ‘‘sporadic’’ case of BSE, however, does
not explain why the disease occurred in the United Kingdom
rather than elsewhere, given that the rendering and recycling
processes that were prevalent in theUnitedKingdomwere also
in use in many other countries. It might have been a chance
occurrence that BSE arose in this way when and where it did.
Scrapie has been endemic in sheep populations of the
UnitedKingdom and other countries for centuries, and there is
no evidence that it has caused disease in humans. However,
multiple strains of scrapie have been identified, and it is
possible that BSE is a modified form of one of these strains, or
that it is a strain of scrapie that occurs in sheep at very low
frequency. In either case the strain could have been introduced
into cattle through the rendering process, but again this
hypothesis does not explain why the epidemic began in the
United Kingdom or why it occurred in the 1970s or early
1980s, as MBM had been used for many years before this. One
explanation originally proposed was that the ratio of sheep to
cattle entering the rendering processes was higher in theUnited
Kingdom than in most other countries, so that there was
potentially a high concentration of the scrapie agent in MBM
from theUnited Kingdom. Furthermore, changes to rendering
processes were made around 1980 that may have reduced their
capacity to lower the infectivity of scrapie agents (2). More
recently, evidence has emerged that the United Kingdom was
one of the first countries, in the 1970s, to start feedingMBM to
very young calves and there is some evidence that young
animals may have increased susceptibility to BSE (7).
Impact of control measures
Epidemiological studies that were conducted shortly after the
recognition of the BSE epidemic implicated MBM as the
probable vehicle of transmission. Control measures banning
the feeding of ruminant protein to ruminants were put in place
in the United Kingdom in 1988, although at that time ruminant
protein was still allowed to be fed to pigs and poultry because
they were not thought to be susceptible to infection with the
BSE agent. These control measures had a major impact on the
epidemic, but it was not immediately apparent because of the
long incubation period associated with the infection: animals
were probably infected during their first year of life but the
disease only manifested, on average, four or five years later.
Fig. 1 shows the epidemic curve of the dates of onset of BSE
cases in Great Britain. The peak of the epidemic occurred four
to five years after the introduction of the ruminant feed ban,
consistent with cattle being infected early in life.
Although the feed control measures seemed to have had
a major impact on the epidemic (8), they were not as effective
as had been hoped, and the disease continued to manifest itself
in animals born after the measures had been introduced. This
can be seen in Fig. 2, which is based on the same data as Fig. 1
but shows dates of birth of cases rather than dates of onset of
BSE. It seems reasonable to attribute the sharp decline of BSE
in animals born in 1988 and later to the introduction of the feed
ban, but over 40 000 cases have now been reported in animals
born after the date of the ban. There are several reasons for
this, including a failure to recall feed initially, and ‘‘leakage’’ of
feed intended for pigs and poultry back to cattle by several
routes (9). Such feed was also exported and probably
contributed to the occurrence of BSE in other countries.
Various measures were taken to strengthen the feed ban
in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s and, following the
report of the first cases of vCJD in 1996, a total ban was placed
on feeding mammalian protein to any farmed animals and
existing feed stocks from farms were recalled. It was hoped
that this would totally close off the feed route that had fuelled
the epidemic. The ban was essentially the same as the feed ban
that was introduced across the European Union and in
Switzerland in 2001, five years later.
Advances in knowledge about the epidemiology of BSE
have been hampered by the absence of a diagnostic test that
can be applied to live animals to detect those that are incubating
the infection. As a result, mathematical models of the epidemic
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have been used to estimate the numbers of animals infected at
different times and to predict the impact of control measures
on the evolution of the epidemic. Such modelling has
indicated, for example, that in order to have observed
180 000 cases of BSE in the United Kingdom, about a million
animals would need to have been infected (10). This is because
most animals are slaughtered for human consumption at an age
before BSE would have become clinically apparent. However,
more recent work by this group has indicated that the number
of infected animals may have been substantially higher than
their original estimate (11). On the basis of such mathematical
modelling it was expected that a small number of animals with
BSE would be born after mid-1996 — even if the mammalian
feed ban had been totally effective — because the feed ban
would not have affected cases of BSE that were due to
maternal transmission. It is not certain whether this route of
transmission exists, but epidemiological studies have indicated
that there might be a 10% risk of such transmission to calves
born within six months of clinical onset of BSE in the dam (12,
13). The additional control measure that was introduced— the
culling of the offspring of animals with BSE — should have
eliminated many of these cases, but would not have been
effective for calves born to dams slaughtered shortly before
BSE would have become clinically manifest. Thus, a small
number of cases of BSE would have been expected in cattle
born after 1996, whose dams had been culled or had died
within six months of the calf’s birth.
The number of cattle inwhich the onset of BSEoccurred
during 1999 to 2001 and that were born after mid-1996 was
within the confidence bound of the number predicted due to
maternal transmission from themathematical model. The total
number in the United Kingdom (up to January 2003) stands at
34. However, it seems unlikely that many of these cases can be
explained bymaternal transmission around the time of onset in
the dams, as the dams of most of these animals have survived
far beyond six months after giving birth — so far, with no
evidence of having had BSE. Ongoing epidemiological
investigations are trying to find clues to the origin of these
cases. These studies are not easy because they involve
investigating what happened to animals five to six years
previously. In view of the partial success of the 1988 feed ban,
the favoured hypothesis must be that the cases of BSE in cattle
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born after mid-1996 are due to some residual leakage of
contaminated feed, through a route yet to be identified (14).
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of other routes of
transmission that have been of minor importance in the past,
but which are now more evident as the feed route has been
finally closed off. Importantly, the number of infected cattle
born aftermid-1996 remains low and has not been increasing at
a fast rate, at a time when animals in the 1996–97 cohort are at a
peak-risk age for clinical BSE. Also, many of these cases have
been identified by specific postmortem testing for BSE, rather
than by clinical detection. So, although the epidemic in the
United Kingdom is not over yet, the number of cases has
declined consistently since 1992 and most cases that are now
being reported are of animals born before 1996.
Spread of BSE outside the United Kingdom
Although BSE was first identified in the United Kingdom, it
has since been reported in many other countries, mostly in
Europe. It is highly plausible that the epidemics of BSE in other
European countries were seeded either by cattle exported from
the United Kingdom that were incubating BSE or by the
export of MBM contaminated with the BSE agent. However,
rendering processes that were similar to those prevalent in the
United Kingdom were also practised in other European
countries. Once the infection had been introduced into cattle,
it seems likely that it was recycled to other cattle throughMBM
in the same way as in the UnitedKingdom. Because, in general,
control measures on feed were put in place later outside the
UnitedKingdom, the epidemic curves for other countries have
taken on a different shape. For example, the peak of the United
Kingdom epidemic was in 1991, but occurred much later in
other countries (see Fig. 3). Some cautions have to accompany
Fig. 3. First, the United Kingdom data have been divided by
1000 so that all the curves could fit on the same scale. Second,
most of the cases in the United Kingdom have been detected
by identifying clinical cases of BSE, whereas a high proportion
of cases in other European countries have been detected from
the large-scale testing programmes that have been put in place
for all cattle aged over 30 months entering the food chain.
However, these cautions do not detract from the main point
shown in Fig.3: the peaks of the epidemics occur at different
times in different countries resulting from the impact of the
different times that restrictions were put on feed in different
European countries and the rigour with which they were
enforced. The measures taken in different countries have been
reviewed and assessed by various Scientific Committees of the
European Commission (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/
food/fs/sc/ssc/outcome_en.html#opinions). As mentioned
above, the 1996 ban on the feeding ofmammalian protein to all
farmed animals that was put in place in the United Kingdom
was only implemented throughout the European Union from
January 2001. These measures, if correctly enforced, should
have eliminated transmission, or at least drastically reduced it.
However, it will be some years before the full impact will be
manifest in the decline in detected cases of BSE because of the
long incubation period of the disease.
MBM that was contaminated with the BSE agent was
probably exported from the United Kingdom to numerous
countries, including some outside the European Union and
Switzerland. It is therefore important that surveillance systems
for BSE are strengthened and sustained in these countries,
although the likelihood of a sustained epidemic depends largely
on whether or not there has been recycling of ruminant protein
to ruminants within those countries — a practice that is more
common in industrialized countries. Such recycling has
inherent risks for causing and spreading TSE and should be
avoided.
The human epidemic
The transmission of TSE agents between animals of the same
species is generally easier to achieve than cross-species
transmission and, for example, people have been eating
scrapie-infected sheep for centuries with no evidence of ill
effect. The BSE agent was thought most likely to be a cattle-
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adapted form of the scrapie agent. In the early years of the BSE
epidemic these factors led to the view that it was unlikely that
humans would be infected with BSE. Nonetheless, precau-
tionary measures were put in place: bovine tissues that were
likely to have high titres of the infectious agent— in particular,
brain and spinal cord — were banned from the human food
chain. Also, in 1990, a national surveillance unit for CJDwas set
up in the United Kingdom because any presentation of BSE in
humans was thought likely to resemble CJD.
Concern that BSE may have crossed over into the
human population was heightened in 1995 when CJD was
identified in two teenagers — an age group in which CJD has
rarely been reported — in the United Kingdom. These cases
were followed in 1995 and early 1996 by more cases of CJD in
young people; the neuropathology was found to be very similar
in these patients but distinctly different from that previously
observed for CJD (15). This new variant of CJD (now
designated vCJD) was thought most likely to be caused by
infection with the BSE agent, largely on the grounds of
biological plausibility. The United Kingdom Government
announced the possible link between BSE and vCJD in March
1996, and this was followed by a worldwide ban on British beef
products. Further precautionary measures in the United
Kingdom included banning cattle over the age of 30 months
from the human food chain— a control measure that remains
in place today. In 1996, the epidemiological evidence
supporting the link between BSE and vCJD was not strong.
It consisted, essentially, of the knowledge that BSE and vCJD
appeared to be confined to the United Kingdom and that an
incubation period of 5–10 years was not inconsistent with that
observed following iatrogenic transmission of ‘‘classic’’ CJD
after the use of contaminated human growth hormone (16).
Questioning the relatives of patients with vCJD about the
dietary habits of the patients (and their occupations, places of
residence, and exposure to medical procedures) established no
marked differences from those of people without the disease.
Perhaps this was not surprising, given that the agent may have
been distributed in a variety of beef products, which were
consumed by most of the population, and that the people may
have been exposed to the causative agent a decade or more
previously. It was not until a year or so later that it was
established beyond reasonable doubt that vCJD and BSE were
caused by agents that were indistinguishable (17, 18). The route
of transmission to humans remains unclear, but cattle and
sheep can be infected experimentally by the oral route and the
most plausible explanation for the human cases is from dietary
exposure.Why the disease affects predominantly young people
is currently not understood.
Because of the probable widespread exposure of the
United Kingdom population to contaminated beef products,
there were initial fears that the vCJD epidemic in humans may
be very large. Although the possibility of a large epidemic still
cannot be completely excluded, the number of cases has not
grown at the rate that some feared (Table 1). Because there is
currently no diagnostic test that reliably identifies people
incubating vCJD, and because the average incubation period
may be very long, it has been impossible to predict the ultimate
size of the epidemic with any confidence. Various research
groups have attempted to build mathematical models to
investigate possible scenarios, and current best estimates
indicate that the epidemic may affect fewer than 1000 people
(19–21). However, the confidence limits on estimates are wide
and, although hundreds of thousands of cases seem unlikely,
some researchers are unwilling to exclude the possibility of tens
of thousands of cases (21), whereas others have put the limit an
order of magnitude lower (19, 20). This modelling has been
done with few data inputs, and some important assumptions
have been imposed. The models have not taken account of
possible person-to-person transmission — for example,
through blood transfusions or from contaminated surgical
instruments. Furthermore, they have assumed that the number
of cases will continue to be restricted to approximately 40% of
the population who are methionine homozygous at codon 129
of the prion protein gene (as has been true with cases observed
to date).
Outstanding issues
The measures that were put in place to control the BSE
epidemic in the United Kingdom have resulted in a year-on-
year decrease of 25–45% in the annual number of BSE cases
reported, and the epidemic is now essentially ‘‘under control’’.
The cases arising for animals born after mid-1996 are of some
concern because their etiology is unclear. However, the cases
are small in number and, given the control measures in place, it
is unlikely that they will have a significant impact on animal or
public health. As shown in Fig. 3, the much smaller epidemics
in other European countries are at an earlier stage in their
course than that in the United Kingdom. However, given that
themammalian feed ban has been in place across the European
Union and in Switzerland since January 2001, these epidemics
are expected to decline greatly in the birth cohorts born after
that date. The control measures preventing high-risk bovine
tissues from entering the human food chain substantially
reduce the possible risks to human health. Furthermore, the
testing for BSE of all animals over the age of 30months that are
slaughtered for human consumption provides an additional
safety measure, as this will detect infected animals in the late
stage of the incubation period. The recycling of bovine tissue in
cattle feed was the underlying cause of the BSE epidemic, and
maintaining controls on this should prevent BSE re-emerging
as a veterinary health problem. This lesson applies, of course,
even to countries that have had few or no cases of BSE.
Table 1. Distribution of cases of variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob
disease in the United Kingdoma up to January 2003
Year person died No. of cases
1995 3
1996 10
1997 10
1998 18
1999 15
2000 28
2001 20
2002 17
Total deaths 121b
Cases alive 8
Total cases 129
a Cases outside the United Kingdom: 6 in France; 1 in Ireland; and 1 in Italy. There
has also been 1 case in the USA and 1 case in Canada of people who had
previously lived in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and early 1990s.
b Includes 27 without neuropathological confirmation.
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Priorities for the futuremust include continuing tomonitor the
level of BSE-infected cattle and to enforce controls on high-
risk tissues from entering the food chain.
In addition to the above, there are three outstanding
issues that should be priorities for research and action in the
future, as discussed below.
Diagnostic tests
We still have little idea of howmany people have been infected
with the BSE agent and are incubating vCJD. The develop-
ment of a diagnostic test that can be applied to a tissue that is
easily sampled in life (e.g. blood) and that detects infection early
in the incubation period is of the highest priority. Studies are
under way in the United Kingdom to examine appendix and
tonsil samples, removed during normal surgery, for evidence
of infection with the vCJD agent (22). They may provide some
data on the extent of human infection, although the
interpretation of the results will be severely limited by the
absence of knowledge of the sensitivity and specificity of the
test procedures at different stages of the incubation period.
Studies in sheep indicate that TSE agents may be detectable in
tonsil samples early in the incubation period, and the samemay
be true for vCJD in humans, but this is not certain. So far, the
agent has been consistently detected in the tonsils of vCJD
cases after clinical onset of the disease (23).With a sensitive and
specific diagnostic test it will be possible not only to make a
better estimate of the extent of human infection but also to
implement more focused control measures to guard against
iatrogenic transmission. However, there are formidable ethical
considerations in the deployment of such tests, which may be
of uncertain sensitivity and specificity; for example, they might
diagnose an infection at an unknown point in the incubation
period of a disease that is fatal and currently untreatable.
Iatrogenic transmission
More information on the possibility of iatrogenic transmission
is urgently required. There have been several instances of
iatrogenic transmission of CJD, mostly through the use of
human grown hormone and dura mater grafts, and a few from
contaminated neurosurgical instruments (16). Transmission of
CJD by blood transfusion has not been documented (24), but
because the pathogenesis of vCJD differs from that of CJD—
in particular, in the role of the lymphatic system — the
possibility of transmission of vCJD by this route is an
important health concern, the more so since the recent
demonstration that experimentally induced BSE in sheep
could be transmitted by blood transfusion (25, 26). Because of
the assumed association of the vCJD agent with white blood
cells, leukodepletion of blood used for transfusions has been
implemented in the United Kingdom. Also, in the United
Kingdom pooled plasma products are now sourced from
abroad in an attempt to reduce the theoretical risks from
transmission by these routes. A diagnostic test to determine
whether blood donors have been infected with the vCJD agent
would potentially reduce the risk of transmission greatly by
these routes.
Normal hospital autoclaving procedures do not com-
pletely inactivate the vCJD agent (27), and so it might be
transmitted from patient to patient through the use of
contaminated instruments. Such risks might be reduced by
the greater use of single-use instruments, but this is unlikely to
be feasible for all instruments because some are costly (e.g.
endoscopes), and there might also be other risks associated
with the use of cheaper instruments, which single-use
instruments are likely to be. A generic solution to this problem
will be to develop sterilization procedures that can be routinely
applied and that inactivate the agent, but which are not so
severe as to damage the instruments. A substantial research
programme is under way in this area.
BSE in sheep
The possibility of BSE occurring in sheep is a further cause for
concern. In the United Kingdom sheep were fed the same
MBM that caused the BSE epidemic in cattle, albeit in
considerably smaller quantities than were fed to cattle.
However, less than 1 g of BSE-infected bovine brain fed
experimentally to a sheep can cause BSE (28), and the disease
presents clinically as indistinguishable from scrapie. There is no
evidence of an epidemic of ‘‘scrapie’’ in sheep coincident with
the BSE epidemic in cattle (29), but surveillance for scrapie is
poor, and the possibility that some sheep have been infected
with BSE cannot be excluded. The feed controls that were
implemented to prevent transmission in cattle were also
applied to sheep and, as sheep have a shorter lifespan than
cattle, it is unlikely that any sheep infected through the feed
route are still alive. However, scrapie has been maintained in
the sheep flock for several centuries and, although the routes of
transmission from sheep to sheep are uncertain, some form of
horizontal transmission must occur. Such transmission of BSE
in cattle is, at most, rare and has never been established. Thus,
in sheep if BSE behaves like scrapie, it could have persisted in
the sheep flock despite the imposition of feed controls (21, 30).
Present methods of strain-typing, to distinguish BSE from
scrapie in sheep, have not been fully validated. One method
involves infecting inbred strains of mice by intracerebral
injection and recording the incubation periods and patterns of
brain lesions in the mice. Not only is this a very expensive
method, but a single study takes 18 months or more to
complete. So far, about 180 cases of scrapie have been studied
by this method and none have shown BSE-like characteristics.
However, this does not exclude the possibility that a small
proportion (1–2%, the 95% upper confidence limit in
observing 0 cases in 180 tested) of cases of scrapie may be
attributable to the BSE agent. Urgent priority is being given to
developingmolecular methods of diagnosis that will permit the
rapid differentiation of BSE and scrapie strains. Although high
levels of BSE infectivity are confined to a few tissues in cattle,
the distribution of the BSE agent is much more widespread in
sheep that have been experimentally infected with it. There-
fore, banning specific sheep tissues from the diet would be a
more difficult control option in preventing possible transmis-
sion to humans.
Conclusions
It might not be possible to assess the full impact of the BSE
epidemic on human health for many years. It is likely that
millions of individuals have been exposed to contaminated
beef products in the United Kingdom, but, to date (January
2003), only 139 cases of vCJD have been ascertained. Perhaps
the cattle-to-human species barrier for transmission of the
infective agent is very high, such that the total number of cases
will remain small. However, we cannot exclude at this stage
that the incubation period is very long — possibly several
decades on average — and that the peak of the human
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epidemic is yet to come. The number of cases outside the
United Kingdom is still small (Table 1). The source of the
infection for these cases is unknown, but it is plausible, for
example, that most — if not all — of the cases in France owe
their origin to contaminated meat or meat products exported
from the United Kingdom (31).
There seem to be good grounds for optimism that
the extensive control measures put in place have brought
the transmission of BSE under control in the European
Union and Switzerland. It is important to note, however,
that cases of BSE will continue to arise in future years
because of the long incubation period of the disease. A
significant advance has been made in the development of
postmortem tests, which can now be performed relatively
rapidly and cheaply on brain tissue and enable infected
animals to be detected in the late stages of the incubation
period. These tests are now mandatory for all cattle
entering the food chain aged over 30 months anywhere in
the European Union, and massive testing programmes
have been set up.
The evidence accumulated to date indicates that, although
there has been an enormous BSE problem in the United
Kingdom, the control measures put in place since 1988, and
especially since 1996, have brought the epidemic well under
control, and there is no good reason why the consistent decline
seen over the past decade should not continue. The number of
infected animals entering the food chain now is likely to be very
small, and the controls placed on bovine tissue entering the
market should ensure that any risks to human health will be very
low and will diminish. It would be rash to predict when the last
case of BSE will occur, but the disease in cattle is probably no
longer a significant public health problem, and is unlikely to
become so in the future, provided that appropriate controls are
enforced. However, many challenges remain. n
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Re´sume´
L’e´pide´mie d’ence´phalopathie spongiforme bovine et de nouvelle variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-
Jakob : situation et perspectives
L’importante e´pide´mie d’ence´phalopathie spongiforme bovine
(ESB) au Royaume-Uni est en recul depuis 1992, mais s’est e´tendue
a` d’autres pays. Les mesures de grande envergure mises en place
dans l’Union europe´enne et e´galement en Suisse, si elles avaient
e´te´ correctement applique´es, auraient pu endiguer la transmission
de l’ESB. Les tests post-mortem sur le tissu ce´re´bral permettent de
de´tecter la maladie au cours des derniers stades de la pe´riode
d’incubation chez les animaux infecte´s, mais il est urgent de
disposer de tests re´alisables sur le vivant chez l’animal comme chez
l’homme pour de´tecter les infections a` un stade pre´coce.
Actuellement, le nombre d’animaux infecte´s entrant dans la
chaıˆne alimentaire est probablement faible et les controˆles
effectue´s sur les tissus bovins dans l’Union europe´enne et en
Suisse doivent assurer que les risques e´ventuels pour la sante´
humaine sont faibles et en voie de diminution. La vigilance est
requise dans tous les pays, en particulier ceux ou` il y a eu recyclage
des aliments pour ruminants d’une espe`ce a` l’autre. Moins de
150 personnes dans le monde ont fait l’objet d’un diagnostic de
nouvelle variante de la maladie de Creutzfeldt-Jakob, mais il reste
de nombreuses incertitudes quant a` l’e´volution future de
l’e´pide´mie du fait de la dure´e et de la variabilite´ de la pe´riode
d’incubation. De meilleures mesures de lutte sont indispensables
pour e´viter la transmission iatroge`ne lors de transfusions sanguines
ou par le biais d’instruments chirurgicaux contamine´s. Ces mesures
ne´cessiteront des tests diagnostiques sensibles et spe´cifiques et des
me´thodes de de´contamination plus efficaces.
Resumen
Epidemias de encefalitis espongiformebovina y de la nueva variante de la enfermedaddeCreutzfeldt–Jakob:
situacio´n actual y perspectivas
La importante epidemia de encefalopatı´a espongiforme bovina
(EEB) sufrida por el Reino Unido viene remitiendo desde 1992, pero
se ha extendido a otros paı´ses. Las medidas generalizadas de
control implantadas en toda la Unio´n Europea y en Suiza deberı´an
haber permitido frenar la transmisio´n de la EEB si se hubieran
aplicado estrictamente. Las pruebas postmortem practicadas en el
tejido cerebral permiten detectar la enfermedad en los animales
infectados durante las u´ltimas fases del periodo de incubacio´n,
pero se necesitan urgentemente pruebas aplicables a animales
vivos (incluido el ser humano) que detecten tempranamente la
infeccio´n.
El nu´mero de animales infectados que llegan actualmente a
la cadena alimentaria es probablemente pequen˜o, y los controles a
que se somete a los tejidos bovinos en la Unio´n Europea y en Suiza
llevan a pensar en principio que, si algu´n riesgo hay para la salud
humana, debe de ser pequen˜o y con tendencia a desaparecer. Es
preciso mantener la vigilancia en todos los paı´ses, especialmente
en aquellos en los que ha habido reciclaje de piensos para
rumiantes en el interior de una misma especie. A nivel mundial,
menos de 150 personas han sido diagnosticadas como afectadas
por la nueva variante de la enfermedad de Creutzfeldt–Jakob, pero
hay mucha incertidumbre respecto al curso futuro de la epidemia
debido a lo extenso y variable del periodo de incubacio´n. Se
necesitan mejores medidas de control para proteger contra
posibles transmisiones iatroge´nicas por transfusio´n de sangre o
instrumentos quiru´rgicos contaminados. Estas medidas requerira´n
pruebas diagno´sticas sensibles y especı´ficas y mejores me´todos de
descontaminacio´n.
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